Buying Versus Renting – Determinants of the Net Present Value of Home Ownership for Individual Households by Tabner, Isaac
Accepted refereed manuscript of:  
 
Tabner I (2016) Buying Versus Renting – Determinants of the Net Present Value of Home 
Ownership for Individual Households, International Review of Financial Analysis, 48, pp. 
233-246. 
 
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2016.10.004 
 
© 2016, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/  
 
Buying Versus Renting – Determinants of the Net Present Value of Home 
Ownership for Individual Households. 
Isaac T. Tabner 
This version: 8th July 2016.
Accepted for publication in International Review of Financial Analysis, published by Elsevier.
Abstract 
The tenure decision upon whether to buy or to rent accommodation has long-term 
consequences for households’ financial wellbeing that influence macroeconomic development 
and stability when the cumulative effects of individual decisions are aggregated across 
populations. The author explains how the net present value (NPV) of ownership versus renting 
can be used as a framework for informing housing tenure decisions. Increases in 
holding periods, inflation and the spread between imputed rent and the opportunity cost of 
household 
savings shifts the balance in favour of ownership. With plausible assumptions the 
model demonstrates that households typically need a holding period of between five and ten 
years to 
achieve a breakeven NPV. The findings support the conjecture that inflation transfers wealth 
from renters and mortgage providers to owners, whereas deflation reverses the flow until 
rising 
default levels establish a new equilibrium. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the most important financial decisions that households encounter is the decision 
upon whether to own or to rent housing for personal consumption (tenure choice). It is a 
decision fraught with emotional, value expressive and ideological aspirations that often results 
in culture and policy biases that favour ownership. For example, in countries such as the UK, 
there is social pressure for young people to ‘get a foot on the housing ladder’, while 
homeownership confers status and housing tenure is a standard question in credit applications. 
Social status and the behavioural desire to engage in value expressive activity are examples of 
the consumption benefits of ownership. One manifestation of the behavioural bias towards 
ownership is the difficulty that consumers have in differentiating between investment, 
speculation, insurance and consumption when arranging housing needs. Whereas some forms 
of consumption are easily recognisable, for example purchases of luxury goods; other forms, 
such as expenditure on fashionable home styling, are often confused with investment when in 
reality the recoverable value of such expenditure is close to zero. Furthermore, preoccupations 
with supply restrictions distract purchasers from the investment risk to which housing is 
exposed, both at the macro level and the individual plot level. This risk is not readily 
diversifiable for households due to the immovability, indivisibility and illiquidity of owner 
occupied housing. In fact, supply restrictions are associated with greater volatility in house 
prices rather than greater stability (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz 2008; Mizuno and Tabner 2011). 
It has been shown that leverage and the concentration of assets that ownership implies, 
results in allocations of savings between risky and risk-free investment that are inconsistent 
with households’ risk tolerance (Becker and Shabani 2010). It is arguable that for most 
households, housing wealth is undiversifiable due to transaction costs, unavailability of 
hedging instruments and financial constraints. These characteristics coupled with government 
interventions result in market imperfections that allow prices to diverge from theoretical 
equilibrium levels for many years (Shiller 2007; Mizuno and Tabner 2011; Shiller 2014). The 
micro and macro implications for financial stability resulting from individual household tenure 
decisions together with the cumulative effects of decisions across many households 
respectively are amplified as prices diverge, or converge, over individuals’ holding periods.  
Prior research provides insights into the mechanisms by which wealth is transferred 
between agents in the housing market by examining tenure choices theoretically, using 
equilibrium models, and empirically, using aggregate data. The author argues that 
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heterogeneity between households enables these insights to be applied for the purpose of 
improving individual tenure decisions. Heterogeneity between households, with regards to 
variables such as marginal tax rates, financing constraints and risk preferences are important if 
market imperfections drive a wedge between theoretical equilibrium prices at the aggregate 
level and optimal choices at the individual household level. The aim of this study is to allow 
for the possibility that divergence from equilibrium can exist and demonstrate how households 
can evaluate the financial consequences of the tenure choices available to them.  
There are many powerful behavioural, emotional and social forces that influence tenure 
choice and these are typically biased towards ownership. Guiding clients’ tenure choices and 
alerting them to the risks that they face if they succumb to such biases without objective 
consideration of the consequences is a service that finance professionals can and should 
perform. To further this aim, the author presents an algorithm for examining the costs and 
benefits of ownership versus renting. For example, if a client’s, cultural, social, political and 
behavioural considerations result in a very high utility value of ownership, wealthy clients will 
accept a negative NPV as the consumption cost of ownership. On the other hand, a financially 
constrained client would be counselled to the effect that although the consumption benefits of 
ownership are very desirable, affordability constraints necessitate compromise upon the level 
of consumption that can be enjoyed. Conversely, if the predicted NPV is positive, then 
ownership offers a margin of safety to mitigate the costs and uncertainty. Finally, if the housing 
consumer is confident enough to bet that conditions will be more favourable than the most 
likely base case, the NPV arising if their forecasts are realised can be categorised as the return 
to speculation. The algorithm is flexible enough to be adapted to most individual circumstances 
and demonstrates that increases in holding periods typically increase the NPV arising from 
ownership, so long as inflation costs combined with the spread of imputed rent over the 
discount rate are not negative. Homeowners with holding periods shorter than five years, or 
holding periods characterised by deflation, or by an adverse spread between imputed rents and 
financing cost, are the most likely to experience a negative NPV. With modest inflation, the 
NPV of ownership is likely to breakeven and turn positive when holding periods are 
somewhere between five and ten years. However, following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
there has been much concern about deflation. If these concerns are realised, many home 
purchases will never breakeven unless they are preceded by increasing rental yields caused by 
prices deflating faster than rents. Wealth transfers resulting from a rapid reset of this kind have 
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the potential to dislocate the economic and social fabric of society creating positive feedback 
exacerbating instability of the financial system.  
1.1 The net present value approach 
The NPV of the buy versus rent decision is determined by calculating the present value 
(PV) of all cash savings arising from homeownership, all cash inflows and all cash outflows 
which are then netted off as in exhibit 1. A key principle illustrated in note B of exhibit 1 is 
that other things being equal: (a) higher cash flows, whether from rental savings or received 
from the proceeds of a home sale, always result in a higher present value and; (b) higher 
discount rates always result in a lower present value. This is because cash flows affect the 
numerator and discount rates affect the denominator of the present value calculation.  
[Exhibit 1 about here] 
The illustration presented here is restricted to a single tenure choice decision at time zero. 
In line with good financial planning practice, that decision should be periodically re-evaluated 
using the same model but with updated inputs as individual circumstances and macroeconomic 
conditions evolve. For tractability, at each evaluation point, model inputs are assumed to 
remain unchanged throughout the holding period. Substantial realised violations of that 
assumption should trigger new evaluations that are incorporated into households’ revised 
financial plans. For households that are financially constrained, or whose human capital is 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks, the model is useful for determining the margin of safety 
required to withstand adverse shocks, for example to interest rates or to income during the 
anticipated holding period.    
The intuition summarised in exhibit 1 allows inputs that are clearly defined and 
ascertainable today to assist in the formation of objective estimates of the range and location 
of possible financial outcomes in the future. The aim is to remove as much guesswork and 
subjectivity as is possible from the housing tenure choice1.  
The NPV analysis can be used to evaluate tenure choices both at the micro level for the 
benefit of individual households and at the macro level to inform economic analysis and 
policymaking. The method is flexible enough to incorporate differences in individuals’ 
                                                 
1 A theoretically appealing but challenging alternative would be to consider a multi-period setting with stochastic 
discount rates but determination of an appropriate probability distribution to characterise the path of future interest 
rates is beyond the scope of this article. Demonstrating that such a method is more effective than simpler 
alternatives and communicating the benefits to financially unsophisticated households is a further challenge. 
4 
 
required return on housing equity and tax rates. For example, an individual might ask a 
financial planner whether they should buy or rent their accommodation; a portfolio manager 
might be concerned about the assumptions needed to justify prevailing mortgage market 
characteristics in the context of current house prices; or, a policy advisor might be concerned 
about the winners and losers arising from a change in housing related tax or interest rates. The 
author demonstrates how such questions can be answered by focussing on the combined effect 
of the spread between the imputed rental yield and the discount rate; inflation; the real growth 
rate of rents and capital appreciation during the holding period. When these combinations are 
positive the NPV of ownership increases with the length of the holding period and vice versa. 
1.2 Factors influencing tenure choice and policy 
It is argued that rents avoided by ownership (imputed rents) often exceed mortgage 
interest while the requirement to save for down-payments provides a powerful savings motive 
that facilitates wealth accumulation. Ownership also confers a hedge against future increases 
in housing costs (Sinai and Souleles 2005; Han 2010; Han 2013) and increases the collective 
value of neighbourhoods because owners are incentivised to invest more in their community 
than renters (Coulson Hwang and Imai 2003; Haurin, Deitz and Weinberg 2003). In addition, 
educational attainment is greater in the children of owners (Aaronson 2000). Conversely, both 
evidence that homeownership constrains economic growth by restricting labour mobility 
(Munch, Rosholm and Svarer 2008; Coulson and Fisher 2009) and, evidence supporting the 
financial benefits of ownership are mixed (for example, Smith and Smith 2006). Other studies 
find that transaction costs and liquidity risk render buying riskier and costlier than renting for 
the majority of the time, although capturing the financial benefit of renting requires individuals 
to be fiscally disciplined and invest all gains from renting into a risk free asset, or a risk 
equivalent portfolio (Hennessey 2003; Lin and Vandell 2007; Beracha and Johnson 2012) 2. A 
possible rationalisation of empirical results in favour of renting is that expected capital gains 
allow landlords to subsidise their tenants housing costs through low rents while allowing 
tenants to diversify their investment portfolios (Linneman 1985). The rise in US house prices 
leading up to 2005 can largely be explained as a correction of previous under valuations and 
as a result of declining real interest rates (Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai 2005). Furthermore, 
tax subsidies for ownership lead to inefficient capital allocation (Hendershott 1983; Mills 1987; 
                                                 
2 In order to reach their conclusion Beracha and Johnson assume an average 8 year holding period; a constant 20% 
loan to value (LTV) ratio and funding via a 30 year non-recourse repayment mortgage. 
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Poterba, 1992; Taylor 1998). In a paper published nearly half a century ago Shelton provides 
multiple citations warning of the financial risks of ownership and says that “economic aspects 
of the [tenure] decision hinge primarily on the family’s prospective duration in the dwelling” 
(Shelton 1968, p. 62). More recently, Haurin and Gill (2002) demonstrate empirically that 
ownership is positively associated with expected holding periods, arguing that this is due to 
greater amortization of transaction costs over longer holding periods. Although, most housing 
consumers seem to believe that ownership benefits are worth paying a premium for (Sekkat 
and Szafarz 2011), the message from all of these studies is that the relative costs and benefits 
of ownership vary considerably over time and between households. 
Advice regarding the tenure decision must take into account economic and market 
conditions, together with behavioural biases associated with the prevailing social and political 
environment, in addition to the individual household’s circumstances. Social, political and 
individual behavioural biases frequently lean towards ownership. Therefore, the present study 
provides a mechanism by which households can objectively gauge the financial implications 
of such biases. The algorithm and analysis presented here explicitly recognises and addresses 
the fact that prices, liquidity and, to a lesser extent, financing costs are market determined 
(exogenous) variables, whereas affordability is primarily driven by individual circumstances 
that are endogenous to the consumer in question. For example, individual components of 
financing costs, marginal tax rates and holding periods. This has the result that the weight of 
the consumption component relative to the investment component of a home purchase varies 
between individuals and over time in such a way that the same opportunity may be a good 
prospect for one individual but a dead loss for another. While the majority of studies examine 
tenure choice at the macro level using aggregate data, the author examines the mechanism by 
which individual household characteristics interact with macro variables to influence the 
financial outcomes of tenure choices, thus contributing to discussions about wealth 
redistribution arising from policies favouring ownership. 
One compelling explanation for the bias towards ownership in the face of empirical 
evidence demonstrating financial gains to renting is that purchases are a hedge against future 
increases in housing costs (Sinai and Souleles 2005; Han 2010; Han 2013). These authors argue 
that housing price risk affects demand through two channels. The first channel is conventional 
financial risk that is positively associated with required return and negatively associated with 
demand. Financial risk is particularly important for home owners because of the illiquidity and 
difficulty in diversifying the risk of housing assets. The second channel works in the opposite 
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direction to the first and arises because housing consumers face the risk of future real increases 
in housing costs. For households in which the second channel dominates, the expected return 
of housing is negatively related to the price risk of housing consumption. Thus, households are 
sometimes prepared to accept low or even negative expected returns as the price for insuring 
against unexpected increases in housing costs. The price of insurance, or the magnitude of the 
negative expected returns, is greatest when population and hence demand are expected to grow 
faster than supply, thus increasing the risk of upward price volatility (Han 2013). In this setting, 
prices appear expensive relative to rents because they reflect the premium for insurance against 
real house price inflation paid by consumers who purchase. If subsequent real price growth 
does not materialise, or is negative, the premium costs are partially offset by reductions in the 
cost of future consumption. For example, in the event of a 10% market wide price fall, a young 
couple selling their first $200,000 home at $180,000 would typically move to a larger property, 
e.g. $400,000. If they retained sufficient equity from their first home, the $20,000 loss realised 
is more than compensated for by the $40,000 discount when they buy the second $400,000 
property at $360,000.  
The author’s analysis can inform households of the costs and benefits of using ownership 
as a means of insuring against price rises by taking into account their specific funding 
arrangements and the nature of their expected housing transitions. For example, the Sinai 
Souleles and Han (SSH) model of insurance, argues that house price falls are hedged for 
homeowners because lower future housing costs offset capital losses realised when the current 
home is sold. However, this mechanism is ineffective for households who are unable to relocate 
to a ‘cheaper’ home because their equity has been wiped out due to price falls occurring when 
their loan to value (LTV) ratio is high. Likewise, someone who for lifecycle or other reasons 
needs to downsize to a smaller property, or relocate to where prices have not suffered an 
equivalent negative adjustment may find that cost savings arising from the reduction in future 
housing costs either, do not materialise, or are insufficient to compensate for capital losses 
realised when the first home is sold. Reversing the above example of the young couple to an 
elderly couple selling their family home previously valued at $400,000 for just $360,000. The 
$20,000 discount they obtain off their $200,000 retirement accommodation falls short of the 
$40,000 loss realised on the sale of their previous home. Thus, the insurance derived from 
ownership during the first tenure becomes costly to the point of being ineffective during 
transition to the new tenure. Examining the NPV of ownership allows households to quantify 
the margin of safety according to their personal circumstances. 
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The legal environment is also an important determinant of the economic implications of 
tenure choice. In jurisdictions such as Germany, where tenant protection is high relative to 
landlord protection, security of tenant tenure and limitations on rent increases mitigate the risks 
of renting and tilt the economic analysis further in favour of renting, if other variables remain 
constant. Debtor and creditor protection also varies between jurisdictions; so for example, in 
the UK mortgages are issued on a recourse basis allowing the lender to pursue the borrower for 
additional compensation if a home-owner defaults with negative equity. In contrast, US 
mortgages are typically issued on a non-recourse basis providing borrowers with an option to 
put their homes back to the lender and walk away from further liabilities if the value of the 
home falls below the value of the mortgage. Personal bankruptcy conditions are also less 
onerous in the US compared to the UK. Both of these characteristics make home ownership a 
less risky proposition for US borrowers when compared to their UK counterparts.  
The next section provides guidance on how to determine the model inputs while Section 
3 provides a step by step explanation of how the model can be applied to a hypothetical tenure 
decision. Section 4 examines how sensitive the model outputs are to changes in the underlying 
assumptions and the relationship between the inputs. The final section concludes. 
2 Determining model inputs 
[Table 1 about here] 
A full list of inputs and their definitions is provided in table 1 together with some 
assumed values that are used to demonstrate the model in section 3. Some of the inputs in table 
1 are market derived and require little adjustment. For example, market prices of available 
houses at time of purchase, P0, are relatively easy to verify. Likewise reliable estimates can be 
formed of purchase and resale transaction costs; including taxes, contemporary mortgage 
interest rates and arrangement fees. Usually it is easy to determine imputed rent by comparing 
rental yields of properties similar to ones that the prospective owner would rent if they decided 
against buying, but adjusted downwards to account for the maintenance and insurance costs 
included in the rental payments. Other inputs, such as the discount rate, inflation forecast and 
real growth rates, require judgement and are harder to determine precisely.  
For individuals, the expected holding period is important because it determines the period 
over which round trip transaction costs can be amortised so that the longer the period the lower 
the cost. In addition, during periods of rising prices longer holding periods allow the value of 
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the inflation hedge tied to ownership to be realised. Risk managers and policymakers working 
at the aggregate level, can use known averages for holding periods as a working assumption, 
whereas individuals may form estimates about their likely holding period based upon personal 
circumstances such as their employment and financial security, age and life aspirations. Life 
aspirations often include social pressure from friends and family members, and a desire to 
transfer wealth to succeeding generations. 
It is more challenging to determine appropriate assumptions for the capital appreciation 
rate, the imputed rental growth rate, average borrowing costs (when not fixed) and the discount 
rate adjusted for individual circumstances including risk preferences. Suggestions for these are 
detailed in turn below. 
Risk and capital appreciation rates 
Ungeared housing assets display less variability in returns than equity markets but for 
many households the variability of housing equity is magnified considerably by gearing. For 
example, if the volatility of ungeared housing is one third that of equity markets, then a loan to 
value (LTV) ratio of 67% increases the volatility of homeowners’ equity to a comparable level 
to that of an ungeared equity portfolio. In addition, Lin and Vandell (2007) demonstrate that 
traditional real estate valuation methods understate risk and overstate returns compared to more 
liquid assets by failing to account for the marketing period, and the need for liquidity 
experienced by some investors. Their analysis suggests that for US investors in the residential 
market, with a holding period of less than one year, accounting for marketing period risk 
increases the risk faced by 3.4 times that estimated using traditional methods. For longer term 
investors, actual risk is around 40% higher than the risk estimated using traditional methods 
(Lin and Vandell 2007 p. 321). Various other studies document the variability of housing 
markets in relation to macroeconomic variables such as consumer price inflation, GDP and 
household disposable incomes. While prices tend to rise broadly in line with these variables 
over the long term, considerable deviations from these relationships can persist for periods 
exceeding ten years (for example, Mizuno and Tabner 2011; Ambrose, Eichholtz and 
Lindenthal 2013). Therefore, for a long holding period it may be reasonable to use the working 
assumption that prices will broadly track economic growth rates. However, for shorter periods 
of less than ten years one could argue that a high risk premium is required around an expected 
real appreciation rate of zero, to compensate for the potentially wide and unpredictable 
deviations from trend values and liquidity risk. Arguably the inflation hedging characteristics 
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of ownership are more likely to be outweighed by transaction costs, liquidity and price risk 
over shorter periods. 
Rental yields 
At the basic level, the imputed rent IR is the annual rent, R, of a furnished property that 
is equally desirable to the one that is available for purchase after deducting both the annual 
maintenance costs, m, required to sustain the value of R in real terms and the building insurance 
costs, i. Both of these items would normally be included in the rental cost of a furnished let. 
For housing consumers, the tax rate on IR is typically zero enhancing the competitiveness of 
owned housing relative to many other assets, although exceptions exist such as in Switzerland 
(Bourassa and Hoesli 2008). A more nuanced approach has been argued on the basis that many 
households are happy to rent an inferior home to that which they would buy, perhaps because 
features of rental properties that conflict with their style and values are more easily externalised 
as being due to the landlord’s bad taste and neglect than the same features in an owned property, 
or: alternatively, because rental properties are seen as a short term solution, with the result that 
consumers focus more on their primary needs, such as type and distance to work. Hence the 
wedge between an acceptable owned property and an acceptable rented property reflects some 
of the consumption component of housing. This can be addressed by deriving the yield from 
the rental value of a property that the household would be prepared to occupy if they chose to 
rent, rather than buy.3 Likewise, some properties are let unfurnished, often at a lower rent and 
for longer periods, necessitating a corresponding adjustment to the model inputs. 
Risk premiums and discount rates 
The discount rate is the return required by home purchasers to compensate them for the 
opportunity cost incurred by not investing their home equity capital including down-payments 
elsewhere (see, for example, Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai 2005). In the Gordon Growth 
Model, present value is defined as the cash flow at time t, divided by the discount rate less 
expected growth rates. Hence to calculate the present value of home ownership imputed rents 
are the numerator, and the discount rate less the expected growth rate is the denominator. 
Hence, other things being equal one or both of a higher imputed rent or, a lower discount rate, 
increases the present value of ownership. In this setting, the denominator is often referred to as 
                                                 
3 In countries where ‘do it yourself’ (DIY) home improvement is fashionable, it could be argued that the reverse 
also occurs, whereby households purchase homes in a worse state of repair than they would be prepared to 
rent with the view to carrying out home improvements in their spare time. 
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the capitalisation rate (Hendershott and MacGregor 2005). Given the substantial risks to capital 
arising from homeownership, the discount rate rn should compensate for the opportunity costs 
of risk free investments forgone, plus a premium for the risk and illiquidity of housing assets.  
Given the fixed physical location of housing assets within specific legal jurisdictions, it 
is also appropriate to adjust the discount rate to reflect differences in relative legal risks 
between homeownership and renting. For example, in jurisdictions where tenant protection is 
high, the insurance premium against rental increases defined in the SSH model is arguably 
lower because tenants have less fear of rent increases. The SSH insurance premium is a 
negative component of the discount rate, hence the overall discount rate applied to ownership 
cash-flows increases when the value of the insurance premium declines. Increasing discount 
rates lower the present value of the financial benefits to ownership as demonstrated by exhibit 
1, note B. Similarly, in the US where mortgage creditor protection is lower than in the UK, as 
typified by non-recourse mortgages and less onerous personal bankruptcy conditions, the risks 
of ownership financed by mortgages are lower than for UK consumers. In this setting, the 
discount rate applied to the financial benefits of ownership should be lower in the US than in 
the UK. However, such effects might be offset in an efficient capital market if creditors demand 
higher borrowing costs as compensation for the lower creditor protection. 
Regardless of the scaling method used to determine the risk premium, or the assumptions 
concerning investors’ levels of diversification, rn also varies between individuals depending 
upon their tax status and funding requirements. Well-funded individuals who expect to hold 
for the medium or long term may sacrifice expected returns in exchange for the hedge against 
future increases in housing costs (Han, 2010; 2013). In most jurisdictions where imputed rent 
is not taxed, it is important to discount using an after tax required return. In addition, when 
holding periods are finite, a higher risk premium is required to compensate for fluctuations in 
the resale value of the property encountered when the consumer relocates. In summary, shorter 
holding periods, or higher LTV ratios warrant a higher discount rate to reflect the greater risk 
to owners’ equity. 
Growth rates of imputed rent and capital 
The nominal imputed rental growth rate, GRn, should not generally exceed the overall 
level of economic growth in the region in which household occupants are likely to be employed. 
In a mature economy it is often appropriate to make the simplifying assumption that the GRn 
is equal to the rate of inflation so that the real growth rate GRr is zero. A similar principle 
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applies to nominal and real house price appreciation rates GPn and GPr respectively. However, 
positive real rental growth and capital appreciation rates are known to persist for long periods 
in many markets including the US, Japan and the UK (Mizuno and Tabner 2011). Sustained 
positive growth rates are arguably a result of supply constraints that cause housing costs to take 
a larger proportion of household income and GDP. Forecasting where the upper bounds of 
housing’s share of GDP lie is challenging. The risk of abnormal positive growth makes the 
inflation hedging characteristics of ownership more attractive. Indicators of such risks could 
include situations where the current price level is either far below historical levels relative to 
GDP, incomes or rents, or far below levels already attained in other regions that have realised 
similar growth. In these situations, households with a speculative disposition can reasonably 
incorporate modest positive real growth rates into their assumptions for short/medium term 
holding periods. Likewise, if they are well-funded and expect their next move will be an 
upgrade to a more valuable home in the same neighbourhood, a low or even negative discount 
rate may be accepted in exchange for the inflation hedge conferred by ownership.   
3 Implementing the model step by step 
The first stage is to determine the model inputs. Assumptions used in the worked example 
are summarised in table 1. The author assumes a repayment mortgage with a 25 year term, a 
discount rate of 6%, a purchase price of $200,000 and an initial LTV of 50%, so the initial 
mortgage is $100,000. These parameters are easily varied for sensitivity analysis as in section 
4.  
3.1 Calculate the total purchase cost 
From table 1, the total purchase cost, TP0, of the property is, 
TP0 = P0 + F + PC = $200,000 + $10,000 + $10,000 = $220,000  (1). 
Where F and PC are furnishing – renovation and purchase costs respectively each comprising 
5% of the initial $200,000 price. 
3.2 Determine the initial mortgage principal, MP0, to be borrowed,  
The initial mortgage principal is the purchase price less the value of the down-payment 
provided. 
MP0 = P0 –DP = $100,000      (2). 
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3.3 Determine the mortgage payments in arrears and total holding period 
mortgage payments.  
Annual mortgage payments in arrears, PMP, for a repayment mortgage equal the cash 
flows from a level payment annuity with the same number of cash flows and discount rate as 
the mortgage.4 So for example, a hypothetical 25 year mortgage with a fixed rate of 6% and a 
balance of $100,000 would have annual payments of, 
   
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The first mortgage payment of $7,823 is comprised of $6,000 of interest and $1,823 of principal 
repayment. If the expected holding period is, for example, eight years and we assume that the 
homeowner expects to sell up and repay the outstanding balance at the end of this, then the 
total mortgage payments during the holding period are $7,823 × 8 = $62,581, excluding sale 
transaction costs captured by SC. 
3.4 Calculate the future and present value of mortgage interest and principal 
payments 
Determine the present value of mortgage payments over the holding period 
The present value of mortgage payments made over the holding period can also be 
calculated using the formula for the present value of an annuity, bearing in mind that the 
appropriate discount rate for the individual consumer may not be the same as the mortgage 
financing rate. Using the above example, if the appropriate discount rate is the same as the 
mortgage rate 6%, we calculate the present value as, 
 
577,48$
06.0
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1
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PVMP      (4). 
                                                 
4 Annual payments are used in this example to simplify the illustration, but converting from annual to monthly 
payments for a real life case is a trivial exercise. The use of monthly, continuous or annual intervals does not 
change the conclusions reported here. However, when applying the model in practice, the compounding period 
should be the same as the respective household’s financing arrangements, otherwise, the difference could be 
material enough to alter the recommended tenure choice. An example spreadsheet is available from the author. 
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Determine present value of the principal payments over the holding period 
The principal payments in a mortgage increase each period at the rate of mortgage 
interest, so for example, the principal payment for the first period of $1,823, will have increased 
by 6% to $1,932 by the second payment and so on. This means that we can calculate the present 
value of principal payments over the holding period using the formula for a growing annuity 
as in eq. (2), but substituting the mortgage interest rate for the growth rate as follows: 
PVMPP = MPP1 × 

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which in our above example is, 
PVMPP = $1,823 × 



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

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06.00600001.0
0600001.1
06.1
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8
= $13,756     (5). 
Note that, this method only works when the discount rate does not exactly equal the 
mortgage rate. In our example, the discount rate is the same as the mortgage rate causing the 
denominator, rn – rm, in the growing annuity factor to be zero. Therefore, we adjust the discount 
rate by a tiny amount, in fact an amount as small as 1 × 10-9 works to within $0.01 in the above 
example. Given that estimation of discount rates is always imprecise, it is trivial to ensure that 
it never exactly equals the mortgage rate.  
Determine the interest component over the holding period 
Continuing the above example, we know that the present value of the mortgage payments 
made over the holding period is $48,577 and that the present value of principal payments is 
$13,756, hence the present value of the interest payments made over the holding period is 
$48,577 – $13,756 = $34,821. 
3.5 Determine the principal outstanding at the end of the holding period 
The total principal paid during the holding period can be calculated as the future value 
of an annuity in which the first principal payment is the cash flow and the discount rate is the 
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mortgage interest rate. Hence the principal outstanding, MPT, is the original loan amount less 
the principal paid as in,  
MPT = 
 




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 
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T
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823,1$000,100$
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960,81$040,18$000,100$       (6). 
3.6 Forecast the net future resale value and calculate the present value 
Using the inputs assumed in table 1, net future resale value is calculated using the 
formula, 
NPT = P0 × (1 + GPn)
T
  – SC – MPT = $195,801    
PT = 1.05
8 × 200,000 = $295,491, SC = 0.06 × $295,491 = $17,729 and MPT = $81,960 (7). 
The present value of NPT is, 
PVNPT = NPT / (1 + rn)
T = $122,848    (8). 
3.7 Determine the imputed rent and its present value 
The net rental saving (imputed rent) from ownership is, 
IR = R – i – m – TIR      (9). 
So from our example in table 1, the gross rent, R, is $12,000, i and m are each $2,000 and tax 
on imputed rent, TIR, is zero, so IR is $8,000. If we make the simplifying assumption that i, m 
and TIR remain a fixed portion of R, we can calculate the present value of imputed rent, PVIR, 
using the formula for calculating the present value of a growing annuity as in, 
PVIR = IRt × 
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Again, from table 1, 







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


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


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
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

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05.006.0
06.01
05.01
1
8
× $8,000 = 7.3 × $8,000 = $58,421  (10). 
3.8 Calculate the net present value of all cash flows over the holding period 
 Present value of total cash inflows are: $122,848 + $58,421 = $181,269 
The present value of total cash outflows excluding selling costs are:  
DP + F + PC + PVMIP + PVMPP = $100,000 + $10,000 + $10,000 + $13,756 + $34,821 = 
$168,577. 
Hence the NPV is $12,692 = $181,269 – $168,577. 
The breakeven discount rate (internal rate of return) generating an NPV of zero is 7.37%. 
[Exhibit 2 about here] 
3.9 Synopsis 
Application of the above process for the guidance of individual households can be 
distilled into the 11 steps identified in Exhibit 3. Exhibit 4 provides a five step distillation of 
the process for policymakers and professional investors who may wish to apply the process to 
determine whether to cap LTV ratios, require financial institutions to hold more capital, or to 
evaluate the cost of subsidies to homeownership such as mortgage guarantees, right to buy and 
shared equity schemes. Investors may apply the same analysis to guide judgements about 
whether or not to invest in mortgages, bank equity or other housing related assets. Likewise, 
bank risk managers may use the analysis to guide lending decisions.  
[Exhibit 3 about here] 
[Exhibit 4 about here] 
4 Analysis of model outputs 
Figures 1 through 5 plot NPVs calculated as in section 3 for the purchase of a hypothetical 
home at a market price of $200,000 through different holding periods. Assumed purchase costs 
including legal fees, transaction taxes, furnishing and refurbishment amount to $20,000 and 
resale transaction costs are assumed to be $12,000 at current prices. The different charts 
represent variations in the relationship between key inputs and demonstrate how these 
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relationships interact with the NPV for different holding periods. The five charts demonstrate 
that NPV usually increases in a non-linear fashion with holding period. The form of this 
relationship depends upon the financing arrangement, inflation and the spread between imputed 
rental yields and discount rates. So for example, if the imputed rent yield is 5% and the discount 
rate is 4%, the spread is 1%. Conversely, if the yields are 4% and discount rates 5%, then the 
spread is minus 1%. 5Overall, both: (a) the rate at which NPV rises with holding periods and; 
(b) the total NPV achievable, increase as spreads and inflation increase, thus enabling the 
breakeven NPV of zero to be realised over shorter holding periods. 
4.1 Analysis of financing variations when real rental growth is zero 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 demonstrates how the NPV breakeven holding period and NPV range varies 
according to changes in the discount rate for a fully funded housing consumer when the 
imputed rental yield is constant at 4.5%; inflation and the real growth in imputed rental yields 
and house prices are all held at zero. Purchase and resale transaction costs are as assumed in 
table 1 giving round trip costs of $32,000 for a hypothetical holding period of zero. When the 
discount rate is 3% so that the spread (imputed rent less the discount rate) is 150 basis points, 
a breakeven NPV of zero after transaction costs is achieved within a holding period of 12 years. 
In this setting the NPV continues to increase to reach $60,990 by the end of the 60 year 
evaluation period. When the spread is compressed to 50 basis points by increasing the discount 
rate to 4%, the holding period required for NPV to breakeven is extended to 51 years. 
Breakeven NPV is never achieved when the required return matches the imputed rental yield 
(zero spread), while a negative spread of 50 basis points results in an NPV that gradually 
declines towards a negative $40,000 as the holding period is extended to 60 years. In the last 
setting, a housing consumer may determine that a 50 basis point negative spread is a reasonable 
price to pay for the consumption benefits of ownership. Alternatively, household who is 
indifferent about the consumption benefits of owning versus renting, may still find the 50 basis 
point negative spread from ownership to be good value as an insurance premium against 
increases in future housing costs, as in the SSH model. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
                                                 
5 If tax relief on mortgage interest is greater than zero, the net mortgage financing rate is correspondingly reduced 
by the amount of relief available. 
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A somewhat different approach to analysing the spread of imputed rent over the discount 
rate is adopted in figure 2. Here, imputed rent, inflation, capital appreciation and rental growth 
rates are all assumed to be zero. In this hypothetical scenario, a positive spread is achieved by 
allowing the discount rate to be negative. In the context of Han (2010) such a scenario could 
occur when households perceive the investment risk of ownership to be low, but the risk of 
housing cost inflation to be high with the result that the inflation insurance conferred by 
ownership is valuable enough to warrant a negative discount rate. In this setting, a positive 
spread of 2% gives a breakeven holding period of around 8 years if the other assumptions are 
held constant. Furthermore, the NPV increases at an increasing rate as the holding period is 
extended. When the spread is zero, transaction costs are never recovered but the NPV never 
declines below transaction costs. However, when the imputed rental yield is less than the 
discount rate so that the spread is negative, NPV declines as holding period increases. Unlike 
in figure 1, the positive spread resulting from a negative discount rate results in a convex 
relationship between NPV and holding period cash-flows, with the result that, the present value 
of cash flows increase as they move further into the future, i.e. inverse compounding. 
4.2 The role of inflation for a fully funded purchaser 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The previous section demonstrates how breakeven NPV holding periods vary according 
to the spread between imputed rental yields and the required return on the capital invested when 
inflation is held constant at zero. Holding, inflation, capital appreciation and imputed rent 
constant at zero, figure 2 allows us to focus directly upon the spread between imputed rent and 
the discount rate. In figure 3, the discount rate is also held constant at zero together with real 
prices and rents but inflation varies for each line plot. Presenting figures 2 and 3 in this way 
allows a near direct comparison of the relationships between the spread of imputed rent over 
discount rates and holding periods in determining NPV and between inflation and holding 
periods in determining NPV. This comparison reveals that inflation and spreads are nearly 
identical in their effect on NPV for a given holding period. Thus, as with the 2% spread plotted 
in figure 2, two percent inflation results in NPV breaking even after eight years and rising 
towards $400,000 as the holding period is extended to 60 years. Hence the inflation hedging 
characteristics of housing documented by (Sinai and Souleles 2005) mean that even when 
imputed rent, the discount rate and capital appreciation are all zero, ownership confers a benefit 
provided that inflation is positive. Conversely, when inflation is zero or negative, nominal rents 
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are constant or declining so that breakeven NPV is never reached unless the yield spread of 
imputed rent over the required return is sufficiently positive to cancel out the negative effects 
of deflation. 
4.3 The role of inflation for a mortgage financed purchase with a LTV of 90% 
[Figure 4 about here] 
In figure 4 we extend the analysis of figures 1 - 3 to examine how NPV is determined 
when the purchase is made using a mortgage with an initial LTV of 90% and an interest cost 
of 3% pa. Imputed rent and the discount rate are both 4.5% resulting in a spread of zero. We 
can see immediately that with inflation at zero breakeven NPV occurs when holding periods 
exceed 16 years. NPV slowly rises to a maximum of $9,500 for holding periods of 60 years. 
Breakeven is only reached because the financing cost (3%) is lower than the discount rate and 
imputed rental yield. When inflation is 1%, the NPV breaks even after a holding period of 8 
years and gradually rises to around $60,000 as holding periods are increased. With inflation at 
2% NPV turns positive within six years gradually rising to $130,000 by the end of the 
evaluation period. Clearly inflation is very helpful to homeowners. One might argue that the 
discount rate should decline as the holding period increases, due to deleveraging as the 
mortgage principal is repaid. This might be justifiable if the housing consumer was confident 
that their holding period would be longer than the mortgage repayment period. The model could 
accommodate this scenario by using a discount rate that reflected the average cost of capital 
over the anticipated holding period. This could justifiably be less than the initial mortgage rate 
due to savings likely to arise from refinancing. As in figure 3, when inflation is positive the 
rise in NPV observed as holding period increases reflects the return from the inflation hedge. 
4.4 Returns to ownership under a range of plausible scenarios 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Central banks in developed markets typically target CPI inflation within the 1 to 3% 
range. It is therefore reasonable to forecast that inflation will mean revert around target levels 
unless policy objectives are changed. In addition, in many areas rising population density, 
fragmentation of families and economic growth that outstrips the supply of available dwellings 
result in both rents and capital values increasing ahead of inflation for periods in excess of the 
expected tenure period. Such arguments are often used to justify purchases, even when imputed 
rental yields appear to make ownership costly compared to renting. Indeed the risk of rapid 
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price appreciation arguably makes owning more attractive as the value of the hedge against 
housing cost inflation is greater (Han 2010). Although it is implausible to assume that property 
prices will increase ahead of aggregate economic growth rates indefinitely, such economic 
imbalances can and do persist over periods long enough to encompass the average holding 
periods of many households (Himmelberg et al., 2005; Mizuno and Tabner 2011). Historical 
excess real returns to ownership provide motivation for housing consumers to seek excess 
returns via speculation, or to hedge against the risk of abnormal price increases. The 
assumptions required to make such a position financially attractive are examined in figure 5. 
NPV is plotted against holding periods for five scenarios in which CPI inflation is assumed to 
be 2% but real capital and rental appreciation rates are allowed to differ modestly from zero. 
The illustration is for a housing purchaser financed by a 25 year repayment mortgage with an 
initial LTV ratio of 90%, a mortgage financing cost of 3%, a discount rate of 6% and an initial 
imputed rental yield of 4.5%.  
If both prices and rents are allowed to increase at a real rate of 1% pa over the entire 
holding period, NPV breakeven is reached within 5 years. If the holding period is extended 
NPV reaches $113,588 after 60 years. If only rents increase by 1% pa in real terms breakeven 
NPV is reached within 6 years and increases to around $100,000 after 60 years. In the scenario 
where both real imputed rent and real capital appreciation are both zero, breakeven NPV is still 
reached within six years and continues to rise thereafter to $55,000 after 60 years. Even when 
both real rent and real capital values depreciate at 1% pa, breakeven NPV is reached within 10 
years when the other assumptions remain unchanged. 
4.5 Critical considerations for the financial evaluation of tenure choices 
Five critical issues for evaluating the financial consequences of tenure choice emerge 
from the above analysis. These are: (1) length of tenure or holding period; (2) relative risk of 
inflation versus deflation; (3) the imputed rental yield; (4) the risk of real changes in housing 
costs and; (5) the discount rate applicable to the individual household. In fact, more crudely, if 
the sum of 2, 3 and 4 minus 5 are positive, then breakeven NPV will be achieved if the holding 
period is sufficiently long.  
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One – Length of tenure or holding period 
Transaction costs are substantially higher when purchasing rather than renting a home 
and are augmented by transaction taxes6. Under reasonable assumptions holding periods of five 
or more years are required to cover the financial transaction costs of home purchases but longer 
holding periods are required if economic conditions and tax rates are less favourable. In the 
UK the average holding period has increased, from 10 years in the 1980s to 14 years during 
the period, 2002 – 2003, and 21 years by 2015, but with big variations between cities such as 
Liverpool, 28 years, and Belfast, 12.6 years (Hometrack, 2015). In the US, estimates vary from 
11.5 years for first time buyers and 15 years for repeat buyers (Emrath, 2013). Therefore the 
average UK or US home buyer would achieve a positive NPV under the majority of scenarios 
examined in this study. 
Two – Inflation versus deflation 
The cumulative effects of inflation or deflation become more apparent as holding periods 
increase. Inflation favours ownership while deflation favours renting; however, their effect on 
individual households differs. Furthermore, households’ perceptions of the relative threats may 
be biased by their recent experiences or that of their parents (representativeness) to the extent 
that they may not adequately update their risk assessments to take into account contemporary 
economic conditions. It is arguable that the inflation hedging characteristics of ownership are 
of greater benefit to younger households that are likely to trade up to a more valuable house in 
the same locale. However, if younger households need a higher loan to value ratio, the risk of 
deflation wiping out their equity and thus making it difficult for them to move at all is greater. 
Typically, younger households are more likely to have shorter holding periods and to relocate 
to a different region where the inflation hedge of the first purchase may not be effective. 
Therefore ownership is likely to be most effective as an inflation hedge for younger households 
who are unlikely to move in the next 10 years and when they do move are likely to stay within 
the same region and be able to accumulate substantial equity during their first period of 
ownership tenure. The risk of deflation renders the inflation hedging characteristics of 
ownership less valuable for households who are likely to relocate to a region with different 
housing market characteristics, households who are unable to accumulate substantial equity, 
                                                 
6 For example, in the UK prior to the 5th April 2015 Stamp Duty Land Tax (stamp duty) was chargeable against 
the value of the entire transaction at a rate that varies with the transaction value. The rate was zero on 
transactions up to £125,000, 1% for transactions from £125,000 – £250,000 and the top rate was 7% on 
transactions of £2,000,000 or above (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 2014). 
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households whose tenure period is likely to be short and households whose next move is likely 
to be into less valuable accommodation. 
Three – Imputed rental yield 
The imputed rental yield is determined by current market conditions affecting the 
relevant housing type, by individual households’ marginal tax rates and also by the local tax 
treatment of housing costs. For example, reliefs on mortgage interest, rents, or imputed rents. 
Four – Risk of positive or negative real growth rates in rent and capital values 
The long run relationships between housing costs, GDP, inflation and incomes are mean 
reverting but phases of misalignment sometimes extend for ten or more years providing 
opportunities for households to realise abnormal gains or losses (Mizuno and Tabner 2011). 
Balancing these risks requires the provision of objective information regarding sustainability 
of real growth rates in the context of historical boundaries of the share of GDP accounted for 
by housing; the demographic and macroeconomic conditions in the region concerned and 
individual household characteristics. These factors should allow reasonable confidence 
intervals for real growth rates to be established. The net present values from the established 
range of reasonable assumptions can then generated. 
Five – discount rate specific to the individual household 
In jurisdictions where imputed rents are free of tax the discount rate applied should reflect 
the opportunity cost of household capital appropriately adjusted for the marginal tax rate on 
investment income. 
4.6 Adapting the model to individual cases 
Every effort has been made to illustrate the generalisability of the model to different 
financial circumstances. However, in recognition that it is not always possible to foresee every 
eventuality, it is helpful, when presented with a novel prospect to undertake the process 
illustrated in exhibit 5 and consider whether the novelty effects net imputed rent, the financing 
cost or an individual cash flow.  
[Exhibit 5 about here] 
For example, an opportunity to purchase below the market value, perhaps from a distressed 
seller or a generous family member, will reduce the cash outlay on purchase but is unlikely to 
reduce the resale value. If the alternative rent is the market rent, the net rental yield will be 
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correspondingly higher than if the purchase had been for market value. The real expected 
capital appreciation rate over the holding period will also be higher if the property is sold at 
the market price. Alternatively, if a client is concerned about job insecurity and a risk that their 
labour income may decline in real terms, a higher discount rate would be appropriate. Finally, 
it is important to stress that the focus of this approach is purely on the financial implications of 
tenure choice. Therefore, if a client has sufficient financial resources and believes that the 
consumption benefits of ownership are sufficiently great, then the emotional, social or other 
rewards of consumption may justify a choice that is financially costly according to the analysis 
presented here. The analysis simply provides a means by which the client can quantify the 
financial implications of her/his consumption preferences. 
5 Conclusion 
Using a plausible range of assumptions, the author demonstrates how the net present 
value of homeownership varies with changes in the holding period. If there is modest inflation 
and a holding period greater than five years, but real rental growth rates are zero and the 
imputed rental yield is the same or slightly less than the homeowner’s cost of capital, home 
purchases are likely to be financially beneficial. This is consistent with the argument that 
ownership provides an inflation hedge for future housing demand (Sinai and Souleles 2005). 
Even when inflation is zero, a modest positive spread between the imputed rent and the cost of 
capital tips the balance in favour of ownership if holding periods are long enough. Deflation 
tilts the balance in favour of renting unless it is offset by a sufficiently high spread of imputed 
rent over the cost of capital. At the margins, differences in risk preferences and marginal tax 
rates result in different costs of capital and hence, different answers to the question, is it better 
to buy or to rent across households. However, when macro-economic conditions result in 
positive/negative net present values for homeowners at the aggregate level it implies the 
existence of wealth transfers from renters and mortgage providers to homeowners and vice 
versa during periods of inflation/deflation.  
While other studies have examined housing tenure decisions, to the author’s knowledge, 
no other studies, examine the combined roles of holding period, inflation and spread of imputed 
rent over financing cost in the context of repayment mortgages. The present approach allows 
evaluation of individual household financing choices when tax rates, discount rates and holding 
periods vary. Financial planners should take expected holding periods into account when 
counselling clients about the financial implications of housing tenure decisions. Vulnerability 
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to housing cost inflation together with the nature of anticipated future housing transitions, 
leverage and risk preferences should be considered when determining an appropriate cost of 
capital. Economic analysts assessing the macro stability of housing and mortgage markets 
should also account for average holding periods, inflation expectations and the nature of 
housing transitions implied by the relevant population’s demographic profile. Inflationary 
policies, mortgage tax relief and an absence of tax on imputed rent without offsetting reliefs on 
actual rent all favour ownership with disproportionate benefits accruing to those with higher 
marginal tax rates. Transaction taxes increase the attractiveness of renting but reduce labour 
mobility for those for whom the consumption benefits of ownership merit payment of the 
transaction tax. 
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Exhibit 1 – Model to Determine the Net Present Value of Ownership versus Renting 
NPV of ownership equals: PV of the total benefits of ownership minus the PV of the total costs of ownership   
PV of the total benefits of ownership equals: 
 PV of imputed rent during the holding period. 
plus PV of the expected future resale value less sale transaction costs and the mortgage principal outstanding 
at time of resale. 
PV of total costs of ownership  equals: 
 Initial down-payment. 
plus Initial purchase transaction costs. 
plus Initial capital expenditure that would normally be avoided by renting, e.g. furnishing and refurbishment 
costs.* 
plus The PV of future mortgage principal payments. 
plus The PV of future mortgage interest payments. 
Note A: Disaggregating mortgage interest from principal payments allows for the possibility that different tax reliefs and 
or charges may exist on mortgage interest, principal payments and imputed rents, while the discount rate may not equal 
the mortgage financing rate. In fact, appropriate discount rates vary between individuals due to differing tax rates, risk 
preferences, size of down-payments and credit ratings. *Often rental properties are furnished, thereby saving renters 
substantial upfront costs on furniture, although, this is not always the case as some properties are let unfurnished, typically 
for longer periods. For unfurnished lets, the rent is typically lower so if such a comparator is used, the present value of 
owners imputed rent will be lower to reflect the reduced cost saving from renting. 
Note B: Present value and future value are standard concepts in financial mathematics relating to compound interest and 
discount rates. So for example, if the appropriate interest rate or discount rate, r, is 10%, the present value of £100 
invested today would be worth a future value of £100 × (1 + r)5 five years from today, when r is expressed as the decimal 
(0.10). So the future value is £161.05 i.e. £100 × 1.15. Using the same 10% discount rate, the future value (£161.05) can 
be converted back to its present value (£100) as follows: £100 = £161.05/1.105. A critical point to note is that in the 
present value calculation, the discount rate is always in the denominator, whereas the cash-flow is always in the 
numerator. This explains the standard principle of finance: that other things being equal, a higher discount rate always 
results in a lower present value and vice a versa. Likewise, a higher cash flow (numerator) other things being equal, 
always results in a higher present value.  
 
 
  
 
28 
Exhibit 2 – Summary of Model Output and Result  
NPV of ownership equals: PV of the total benefits of ownership minus the PV of the total costs of ownership   
PV of total benefits from ownership equals:  
 PV of imputed rent during the holding period (IR). $58,421 
plus PV of the expected future resale value less sale transaction costs and 
mortgage principal at the time of sale. (PT – SC – MPT ). 
 
$122,848 
 $181,269 
PV of total costs of ownership equals:  
 Initial down-payment (DP). ($100,000) 
 Initial purchase transaction costs (PC). ($10,000) 
 Initial capital expenditure that would not normally be required when renting, 
e.g. furnishing costs (F). 
 
($10,000) 
 PV of mortgage interest payments (PVNMI) ($34,821) 
 PV of mortgage principal payments (PVMPP). ($13,756) 
  ($168,577) 
NPV of ownership versus renting equals:                                             $181,269 – $168,577 = $12,692. 
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Exhibit 3 Micro Analysis for Individual Households 
Step Action 
1 Determine the required housing characteristics. 
2 Determine the expected duration of tenure and a reasonable error range. 
3 
Identify both the purchase and rental cost of housing, identified in step 1, and calculate the net 
imputed rent. 
4 Identify affordability constraints (household solvency and income). 
5 Determine attitude to risk and calibrate risk tolerance with affordability. 
6 Evaluate the inflation hedging ability of human capital and market conditions. 
7 Evaluate the risk of housing cost inflation versus deflation for the household.  
8 
Taking into account inflation/deflation risk and household leverage determine an appropriate 
discount rate. 
9 
Calculate the NPV of ownership versus renting following the process detailed in sections 3.1 – 
3.8 above. 
10 
If the NPV of ownership from the above calculation is outside the range of acceptability or 
affordability renting is recommended. 
11 
If the NPV of ownership is within the acceptability and affordability range, redo the analysis 
but with assumptions that are at the plausible limit of adversity. For example, higher discount 
rate, shorter holding period, low inflation or deflation and low or negative real growth rates. In 
this less favourable scenario if household’s financial solvency and risk tolerance render the 
outputs unacceptable then renting is still recommended. 
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Exhibit 4 Macro Analysis for Policymakers or Investors 
Step Action 
1 Determine the household population segment that is of concern.  
2 
Obtain best available data on average prices, rents, expected inflation, mortgage financing rates, 
loan to value ratios, holding periods and income.  
3 
Put the data into the model for each section of the market for which disaggregated data is 
available and calculate the breakeven net discount rate (r – g) implied from the contemporary 
market data. Is this plausible given the average LTV ratios and incomes of the respective 
segment? 
4 
Alternatively/additionally, determine an appropriate discount rate to reflect the risk exposure 
of the respective market segment. Then use this and the market data to derive the implied real 
growth rates. Are they plausible? 
5 
If the results of (3) and (4) above are plausible, redo the analysis but with adverse adjustments 
to the current market conditions that are at the plausible limit of their range. In this adverse 
scenario what proportion of households, banks or other relevant parties are insolvent or in 
financial difficulty? 
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Exhibit 5 Adapting the model to individual cases 
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Table 1 – Definitions, Abbreviations and Assumptions 
no. Abbrev. Definition and discussion 
Section 3 
Assumptions 
and outputs 
1 P0 Market price at the time of tenure decision. $200,000 
2 T Evaluation (holding period) in years 8 
3 MT Mortgage term in years 25 
4 F 
Initial capital outlay not normally incurred when renting. E.g., cost of purchasing 
furniture equivalent to that included in a furnished let, and renovation costs 
typically incurred when acquiring a pre-owned home, percentage of P0. 
5% 
5 PC 
Purchase costs, including transaction tax, legal fees, surveyors’ fees and mortgage 
arrangers’ fees, percentage of P0. 
5% 
6 TP0 Total purchase costs, i.e.  TP0 = P0 + F + PC $220,000 
7 PT Expected nominal market price of property at the end of the evaluation period. $295,491 
8 SC Selling costs, including transaction tax, legal and agents fees, percentage of PT. 6% 
9 NPT 
Net sale proceeds, i.e. NPT = PT – SC - MPT. Where MPT is outstanding mortgage 
principal at the end of the holding period. 
$195,801 
10 PVCOF Present value of total cash outflows $168,577 
11 PVNPT Present value of net future resale value $122,848 
12 PVCIF Present value of total cash inflows $181,269 
13 NPV Net present value of buying versus renting $12,692 
14 DP Deposit (down payment). $100,000 
15 i Annual building insurance costs, percentage of Pt. 1% 
16 m 
Average annual maintenance cost required to eliminate depreciation, as a 
percentage of Pt. It is assumed that property taxes are paid by both owners and 
renters and can thus be ignored. However, in countries where property tax is paid 
exclusively by owners, m may also include property taxes, unless these are 
accounted for separately, as in Hennessey (2003) or Beracha and Johnson (2012).  
1% 
17 R 
Gross rent required to occupy an equivalent fully furnished property percentage of 
Pt. 
6% 
18 TIR Tax rate on imputed rent. This is zero in most countries but not all, e.g. Switzerland. 0% 
19 IR1 
Imputed rent saved by owning in the first year of the holding period, R = R – i – m 
– TIR. Note, unlike some studies, the present study does not included financing 
costs in the definition of imputed rent as these are examined separately. 
$8,000 
20 PVIR 
Present value of IR over the holding period equal to the present value of a growing 
annuity. 
$58,421 
21 GRn Assumed nominal annual growth rate in imputed rental cash-flows. 5% 
22 GRr Assumed real annual growth rate in imputed rental cash-flows. 3% 
23 GPn Assumed nominal annual growth rate in house prices. 5% 
24 GPr Assumed real annual growth rate in house prices. 3% 
25 CPI Consumer price inflation for converting nominal growth to real growth. 2% 
26 NMI 
Mortgage interest paid during the holding period less tax relief received. This is 
zero for fully funded purchasers. 
6% 
27 MTR Marginal tax rate on income from non-housing investments. 0% 
28 TRMI Rate of tax relief on mortgage interest. This is zero in some countries. 0% 
29 PTR Property tax rate, this is paid by both buyers and renters in some countries 0% 
30 CGT Capital gains tax rate, not payable on primary residence in some countries, e.g. UK. 0% 
31 rf Risk free rate of interest for a depositor 3% 
32 rp 
Percentage risk premium return required by the home owner on top of the 
contemporaneous risk free deposit rate scaled according to leverage determined by 
the loan to value ratio. This incorporates the component of opportunity cost that a 
homeowner forfeits by not renting and investing her/his capital in a portfolio of 
risky assets such as equities. 
3% 
33 rn 
Nominal discount (capitalisation) rate comprising the risk free return plus the risk 
premium returns on capital required by a consumer to compensate for risk to the 
home equity including the down payment and the opportunity cost reflecting the 
returns that could have been achieved had the consumer rented and invested their 
funds in the capital markets at a similar level of risk. 
6% 
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no. Abbrev. Definition and discussion Assumption 
34 rm Mortgage interest rate per period 6% 
35 rr Net breakeven real yield implied by the TP0, the NIR and NPT. 7.37% 
36 MP0 Amount borrowed, i.e. present value of mortgage principal $100,000 
37 MPT Mortgage principal outstanding at the end of the holding period, T. $81,960 
38 PMP Periodic mortgage payments (i.e. annual or monthly) including interest and principal $7,823 
39 PPt=1 Principal payment at period t $1,823 
40 LTV Loan to value ratio, i.e. MP/P0.  50% 
41 PVMP  Present value of mortgage repayments during the holding period, principal and interest. $48,577 
42 PVMPP Present value of mortgage principal repayments during the holding period. $13,756 
43 PVMIP Present value of mortgage interest repayments during the holding period. $34,821 
Table 1 lists the name and definitions of inputs to our model and their abbreviated acronyms. In addition, 
the right hand column reports the assumptions used in the calculation demonstrated in section 3. Some 
of these fixed assumptions are also used in the analysis in figures 1 through 4. Percentage figures reflect 
a proportion of the market price. Where these figures are annual, the assumption is made that these costs 
remain a constant proportion of the market value of the respective house throughout the holding period 
evaluated. 
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Figure 1 – Fully Funded purchase with constant NIR but varying discount rate 
 
Note: the figure evaluates the NPV over different holding periods for a fully funded housing consumer 
(no mortgage) when inflation is held at zero; net imputed rent is held constant at 4.5% and the real 
growth rate of net imputed rent and house price appreciation are both zero. The purchase price (P0) is 
$200,000. The four plotted lines represent the relationship between holding period and the NPV of 
purchase when different discount rates are applied. Other assumptions are as in table 1, so that total 
round trip transaction costs assumed for a purchase followed by an immediate resale are $32,000. 
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Figure 2 – Fully funded purchase with different spreads of NIR over the discount rate 
 
Note: the figure evaluates the NPV over different holding periods for a fully funded housing consumer 
(no mortgage) when inflation, net imputed rents, the real growth rate of net imputed rent and house price 
appreciation are all held constant at zero. The purchase price (P0) is $200,000. The four plotted lines 
represent the relationship between NPV and holding period for different spreads of net imputed rent over 
the discount rate, allowing for the possibility that discount rates can be negative if the inflation hedging 
motivation is high. Other assumptions are as in table 1 so that total round trip transaction costs assumed 
for a hypothetical purchase followed by an immediate resale are $32,000. 
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Figure 3 – Fully funded purchase with different levels of inflation or deflation 
 
Note: the figure evaluates the NPV over different holding periods for a fully funded housing consumer (no 
mortgage) when the net imputed rents, the discount rate, the real growth rate of net imputed rent and house price 
appreciation are all held constant at zero. The purchase price (P0) is $200,000. The four plotted lines represent the 
relationship between holding period and NPV with different levels of inflation. Other assumptions are as in table 
1 so that total round trip transaction costs assumed for a hypothetical purchase followed by an immediate resale 
are $32,000. 
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Figure 4 – Different inflation for a mortgage financed purchase and a LTV of 90% 
 
Note: the figure evaluates the NPV over different holding periods for a housing consumer financing a purchase 
with a 25 year repayment mortgage with an initial loan to value of 90%. The average annual interest rate over the 
mortgage term (or holding period if shorter) is 3% and net imputed rent is held constant at 4.5%; the discount rate 
is also 4.5%. The real growth rate of net imputed rent and house price appreciation are held constant at zero. The 
purchase price (P0) is $200,000. The four plotted lines represent the relationship between holding period and NPV 
with different levels of inflation over the holding periods. Other assumptions are as in table 1 so that total round 
trip transaction costs assumed for a hypothetical purchase followed by an immediate resale are $32,000. 
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Figure 5 –Different real growth rates with a 90% LTV mortgage financed purchase 
 
Note: the figure evaluates the NPV over different holding periods for a housing consumer financing a 
purchase with a 25 year repayment mortgage with an initial loan to value of 90%. The average annual 
interest rate over the mortgage term (or holding period if shorter) is 3% net imputed rent is held constant 
at 4.5%; the discount (capitalisation) rate is 6% and inflation is held at 2%. The purchase price (P0) is 
$200,000. The three plotted lines represent the relationship between holding period and NPV with 
different real growth rates. Other assumptions are as in table 1 so that total round trip transaction costs 
assumed for a hypothetical purchase followed by an immediate resale are $32,000. 
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